Abstract-We consider a group of m trusted and authenticated nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless channel in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. We assume that there exists a state-dependent wireless broadcast channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free, noiseless and unlimited rate public channel which is also overheard by Eve. For this setup, we develop an information-theoretically secure secret key agreement protocol. We show the optimality of this protocol for "linear deterministic" wireless broadcast channels. This model generalizes the packet erasure model studied in the literature for wireless broadcast channels. Here, the main idea is to convert a deterministic channel into multiple independent erasure channels by using superposition coding. For "state-dependent Gaussian" wireless broadcast channels, by using insights from the deterministic problem, we propose an achievability scheme based on a multi-layer wiretap code. By using the wiretap code, we can mimic the phenomenon of converting the wireless channel into multiple independent erasure channels. Then, finding the best achievable secret key generation rate leads to solving a non-convex power allocation problem over these channels (layers). We show that using a dynamic programming algorithm, one can obtain the best power allocation for this problem. Moreover, we prove the optimality of the proposed achievability scheme for the regime of high-SNR and large-dynamic range over the channel states in the (generalized) degrees of freedom sense.
scenario where all people in a conference room aim to generate a common secret key in the presence of one or multiple adversaries behind the doors). We restrict our attention to the case where communication occurs either through a broadcast channel, where the received symbols are independent among all receivers of the broadcast transmissions including Eve (given that the transmitted symbols is known), or, through a no-cost noiseless public channel.
Here, extending our earlier partial results appeared in [1] , we focus on the group secret key agreement over a statedependent Gaussian broadcast channel. This model can be motivated by fading wireless channels, where the channel states vary over time; i.e., the variation of SNR 1 level is modeled by the state of the channel. The use of state-dependent channels for secrecy has been of interest recently (see for example [2] [3] [4] [5] and references therein). To gain insight into our problem, we first investigate a deterministic approximation of the wireless channel as introduced in [6] .
For the deterministic broadcast channel we will show that using a superposition based secrecy scheme [7] , we can develop a group key agreement protocol that can be shown to be information-theoretically optimal. This can be done by converting the deterministic channel to multiple independent erasure channels. In particular, we show that we can get the same key agreement rate for the entire group as we would get for a single pair of nodes. Therefore this result demonstrates that in the presence of an unlimited public channel, we get secret key-agreement rates for linear deterministic channels, that is invariant to network size. Similar to the case of erasure broadcast channel [8] , a key idea to get this is a connection to network coding (NC), which allows efficient (in the block length) reconciliation of the group secret (also, refer to [9, Appendix A] for a review of our previous results on the group secret key agreement over erasure broadcast channels).
We use the deterministic achievability scheme to get some insight about the Gaussian wireless broadcast channel with state. To this end, we use a multi-layer (nested message set, degraded channel) wiretap code based on the broadcast approach of [7] and [10] to develop a key-agreement protocol for the noisy broadcast problem. This enables a scheme that converts the wireless channel with state to behave similar to the deterministic case. In particular, by using this technique, 1 Signal to noise ratio.
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we obtain a number of independent erasure channels.
As a result, we show that the achievable secret key generation rate is given by a non-convex optimization problem that determines the power allocation over different layers of the wiretap code (e.g., different erasure channels). Although the power allocation optimization problem is non-convex, by investigating and exploiting its special structure, we provide a dynamic programming based algorithm that finds the optimal solution to this optimization problem. The final solution is hard to be written in a closed form expression for the general case. However, the output of our algorithm should not be considered as a numerical approximation but an exact solution. The devised algorithm enables us to evaluate the performance of the proposed group secret key-agreement protocol for various situations.
Finally, we derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate and compare it with the achievable rate by the proposed scheme. Furthermore, we show that although the proposed achievability scheme is not optimal, for the high-SNR regime when there is a large-dynamic range between the channel states, this scheme is optimal in the (generalized) degrees of freedom sense.
A. Related Work
Secret key generation over wireless channels is a problem that has attracted significant interest. In a seminal paper on "wiretap" channels, Wyner [11] pioneered the notion that one can establish information-theoretic secrecy between Alice and Bob by utilizing the noisy broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. However, his scheme works only if we have perfect knowledge of Eve's channel and moreover, only if Eve has a worse channel than Bob. In a subsequent seminal work, Maurer [12] showed the value of feedback from Bob to Alice, even if Eve hears all the feedback transmissions (i.e., the feedback channel is public). He showed that even if the channel from Alice to Eve is better than that to Bob, feedback allows Alice and Bob to create a key which is information-theoretically secure from Eve (also see [13] ). The problem of key agreement between a set of terminals having access to a noisy broadcast channel and a public discussion channel (visible to the eavesdropper) was studied in [14] , where the secret key generation capacity is completely characterized, assuming Eve does not have access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. The case when the eavesdropper also had access to the broadcast channel was the main focus of recent work in [15] and [16] which developed upper and lower bounds for secrecy rates. If the trusted nodes have access to a multi-terminal channel instead of a broadcast channel, [17] and [18] , independently, derived upper and lower bounds for secret key generation capacity under the assumption that Eve has only access to the public channel.
The best achievable secrecy rate by our scheme for the Gaussian state-dependent channel is given by a non-convex optimization problem (see (20) ) which can be reformulated as a generalize linear fractional program [19] . In [20] , the weighted throughput maximization problem have been studied which involves a similar optimization problem to (20) and the authors employs numerical techniques introduced in [19] to solve this problem. In our case, however, the convergence time of such numerical method is not practical and we have to develop a new approach in Section VII to solve optimization problem (20) analytically.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider multi-terminal secret key agreement over erasure networks and wireless broadcast channels with state, when Eve also has access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. Moreover, unlike the information-theoretic works (e.g., [11] [12] [13] [14] , [16] ) that assume infinite complexity operations, our schemes for the deterministic broadcast channels (that includes the erasure channel case [8] ) as well as for the Gaussian broadcast channels are computationally efficient. It is worth mentioning that following a conference version of this work on the packet erasure channel [8] , there has been some attempts to bring those ideas into practical scenarios, e.g., [21] [22] [23] [24] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our notation and the problem formulation. Section III summarizes the main results of the paper. Our general upper bound on the secret key generation capacity for an independent broadcast channel is presented in Section IV. Each of the "deterministic," and "state-dependent Gaussian" models will be discussed in Section V and Section VI, respectively. The solution of the non-convex optimization problem is derived in Section VII. Finally, open questions and future directions will be discussed in Section VIII.
II. NOTATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
For convenience, during the paper, we use [i : j ] to denote the set of integers {i, i + 1, . . . , j }. Given random variables X 1 , . . . , X m , we write X 1:m to denote (X 1 , . . . , X m ). We use also X t to denote (X [1] , . . . , X[t]) where t is the discreet time index. All the logarithms are in base two unless otherwise stated. We write f (x) · = g(x) to denote that log f (x) = log g(x) + o(log x). The notation " · ≤" and " · ≥" are defined similarly.
A. Problem Statement
We consider a set of m ≥ 2 honest nodes {0, . . . , m − 1} that aim to share a secret key K among themselves while keeping it concealed from a passive adversary Eve, denoted by "E". Eve does not perform any transmissions, but is trying to eavesdrop on (overhear) the communications between the honest nodes 2 .
We assume that Alice (terminal 0) has access to a broadcast channel such that the rest of the terminals (including Eve) receive independent noisy version of what she broadcasts (see Figure 1a) , where the input and output symbols of the channel are from some arbitrary sets. We also assume that all of the honest terminals can discuss over a cost-free noiseless public channel where everybody (including Eve) can hear the discussion (see Figure 1b) . The protocol stated in Definition 1 introduces the most general form of an interactive communication between terminals aiming to share a common secret key K (e.g., see also [12] [13] [14] , [16] 
The supremum of the achievable key rate as n → ∞ and → 0 is called the secret key generation (SKG) capacity C s . 
The received vector at the receiver r is modelled by a statedependent white Gaussian channel as followŝ 
C. Deterministic Broadcast Channel
Now, following the idea proposed in [6] , we introduce the deterministic approximation model for our Gaussian channel. We assume that the transmitted vector (packet) sent by Alice is denoted by X A ∈ F L q where F q is a finite field of size q. Then, the received vector at the receiver r is modeled by a state-dependent deterministic broadcast channel as followŝ
where In order to capture and model the different SNR levels for the Gaussian channel, we use the shift matrix model developed in [6] . To this end, we consider matrices F i such that they satisfy the following nested structure
For convenience we assume that F s = I L where I L is the identity matrix of size L. The two extreme states "0" and "s" correspond to complete erasure and complete reception of the transmitted vector (packet) X A . The deterministic model is indeed an extension to the packet erasure broadcast channel, studied in [8] and [24] , which has only two channel states, i.e., s = 1, (see also [9, Appendix A]).
D. Discussion on the Cryptographic Analysis
We do not make any assumption on the computational ability of the adversary, i.e., this leads to the unconditional secrecy in the cryptography terminology. Additionally, it is assumed that the channel state is random and not known by any party including the adversary a-priori. The adversary can hear the Alice's broadcast through a fading channel, and also the acknowledgments through a noise-free public discussion channel, i.e., we consider a passive eavesdropper that does not tamper with the communications of legitimate nodes. Furthermore, we assume all the legitimate nodes are authenticated so only these nodes can participate in the public discussion. Our security model for the adversary is defined in Definition 2, Eq. (2), i.e., I (K 0 ; X n E , D n ) < . This definition provides an unconditional secrecy guarantee which is more powerful than the computational secrecy guarantee. The communication model is also discussed in Section II.
We have demonstrated the value of some of these ideas in test-bed implementations in [22] and [24] .
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of this paper are summarized in the following. For the secret key generation scenario among m terminals that have access to a "deterministic broadcast channel," we completely characterize the key generation capacity. This result can be considered as the generalization of the result of [8] and [24] for "packet erasure broadcast channels" (see Theorem 1). For a "state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel," we provide upper and lower bounds for the key generation capacity and show that these bounds will match in the high-dynamic range, high-SNR regime. Furthermore, the achievable secrecy rate by our proposed scheme for the Gaussian model is described by a non-convex power optimization problem. Although this problem is non-convex, by exploiting its special structure, we find the optimal power allocation that leads to the best secrecy rate achievable by the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1: The SKG capacity among m terminals that have access to a state-dependent deterministic broadcast channel, defined in Section II-C, is given by
where
Theorem 1 is proved in Section V (see Lemma 2 and Lemma 3). Notice that the result of [8] is a special case of Theorem 1 when s = 1.
Theorem 2: The SKG capacity among m terminals that have access to a state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel, as defined in Section II-B, is upper bounded by
Moreover, the secrecy capacity can be lower bounded by the solution of the following (non-convex) optimization problem 
where "
is used to denote for the exponential equality with respect to some scaling parameter Q. Here, as Q → ∞, we asymptotically approach to the high-dynamic, high-SNR regime (for more details refer to Section VII-A).
Theorem 2 is proved in Section VI and Section VII-A. In particular see Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and Lemma 7.
It is worth mentioning that the power optimization problem stated in Theorem 2 is a non-convex problem. Although the closed-form solution of the this problem is not easy to derive explicitly, but by using dynamic programming it can be easily found numerically. In Section VII, based on the structure of this optimization problem and by exploiting special properties of its KKT necessary conditions for the optimality, we propose a dynamic programming algorithm that finds the optimal power allocation (see Algorithms 1 and 2). More specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Algorithms 1 and 2 find the optimal solution of the optimization problem stated in Theorem 2.
The whole Section VII is devoted to proving Theorem 3.
IV. UPPER BOUND FOR THE KEY GENERATION CAPACITY OF INDEPENDENT BROADCAST CHANNELS The secret key generation capacity among multiple terminals (without eavesdropper having access to the broadcast channel) is completely characterized in [14] . By using this result, it is possible to state an upper bound for the secrecy capacity of the key generation problem among multiple terminals where the eavesdropper has also access to the broadcast channel. This can be done by adding a dummy terminal to the 
In general we may have
Initializing the lower bound on I * i 4:
Initializing the upper bound on I * i 5:
At the beginning, the value of I * i is not determined 6: end for 7: d(0).min = P max ; d(0).determined = true Also part of the initialization 8: 
For all I ∈ SolSet find the one which maximizes the achievable rate R; call it I * * 11: return I * * 12: end first problem and giving all the eavesdropper's information to this dummy node and let it to participate in the key generation protocol (we refer the interested readers to [14, Sec. V] for more details). By doing so, the secret key generation rate does not decrease. Hence by combining [14, Th. 4.1] and [14, Lemma 5.1], the following result can be stated.
Lemma 1: The secret key generation capacity among m terminals as defined in Definition 2, is upper bounded as follows
Note that in the above expression for the upper bound, it is possible to change the order of maximization and minimization, see [14, Th. 4 [15] , [16] for alternative improved bounds). However in this work, we use Lemma 1 to derive an upper bound for our problem. This bound is good enough that in addition to the proposed achievability scheme, completely characterize the secret key sharing capacity for the "state-dependent deterministic channels" scenario. Now, back to our problem where the channel from Alice to the other terminals are assumed to be independent, we can Algorithm 2 The Recursive Core Part of the Algorithm that is Called by Algorithm 1
Find an index j such that d( j ).determined = false 4: if there is such j then 5:
Find the root r (1) of the numerator of F (1) k (x) defined in (23) 8:
Based on the value of r (1) , break the interval
for all possible subinterval of the interval
Find the sign of F (1) k (x) in this subinterval 11: According to the sign of F (1) k (x) (and based on Case 1),
.max, and d( j ).determined, but to a new data structure d 12: if d is consistent up to this point then if ∀i
end if 15: end for 16: else Quadratic case 17: Find the roots r
1 and r
2 of the numerator of F (2) k (x) 18: Based on the values of r for all possible subinterval of the interval
Find the sign of F (2) k (x) in this subinterval 21: According to the sign of F (2) 
.max, and d( j ).determined, but to a new data structure d 22: if d is consistent up to this point then if ∀i
end if 25: end for 26: end if 27: else If all d( j )'s are determined 28: if the found solution is consistent then if ∀i we have d(i ).min ≤ d(i + 1).min Corollary 1 [8] , [9] : If the channels from Alice to the other terminals are independent, then the upper bound stated in Lemma 1 for the SKG capacity is simplified to 
V. GROUP SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER DETERMINISTIC BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 that characterizes the secret key generation capacity for a deterministic broadcast channel defined in Section II-C. The proof of this theorem, as an underlying machinery, uses the achievability technique for the packet erasure broadcast channel appeared in [8] and [24] (for more details, also see [9, Appendix A]).
A. Upper Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
Using Corollary 1, the SKG capacity C det s for the independent broadcast channel can be upper bounded by (10) . Then we can state the following result, Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The SKG capacity of the deterministic broadcast channel, introduced in Section II-C, is upper bounded by
Proof: From (10) and because of the symmetry of the problem, we have C det s ≤ max P X A I (X A ; X B |X E ) where we use "A" and "B" to denote for terminal 0 and terminal 1. Then, we can write
and similarly
and applying the chain rule recursively, we get H (
Hence, we can upper bound C det s as follows (11) where (a) is true because conditioning reduces the entropy, (b) is true because uniform distribution on X A achieves the maximum values for all the entropies in the summation, and finally (c) is true because of the assumption we have made in (7) . Also, note that
This completes the proof.
B. Lower Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
In this section, we will present a scheme that achieves the same secret key generation rate as we derived in the upper bound stated in Lemma 2. But before that, let us state the following proposition.
Then it is possible to find subspaces 1 , . . . , s , such that ∩ i∈V i = 0 for all V ⊆ [1 : s] where |V| ≥ 2 and they also satisfy (12) where "⊕" is the direct sum of two disjoint subspaces. Figure 2 demonstrates the proposition.
In our proposed achievability scheme, Alice uses superposition coding where she creates a vector 
So we may view the broadcast channel from Alice to the rest of terminals as s independent packet erasure channels; where i is the set of messages transmitted over the i th channel (layer) and the erasure probability of the i th channel is θ i .
Then we can proceed as follows. On the kth layer, we run independently the scheme propose in [8] and [24] for the secret key sharing problem over an erasure broadcast channel (see also [9, Appendix A] for more details). Then, we can state the following result.
Lemma 3: The achievable SKG rate of the above scheme for each layer k is given by R det
So for the total achievable secrecy rate we have
Observe that this matches the upper bound stated in Lemma 2, and therefore yields a characterization of the group key-agreement rate for deterministic channels, i.e., this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 4: This result can be easily extended to the asymmetric case where the channels to the legitimate users are not statistically identical (but still independent). Moreover, notice that the key-generation rate is the same for any m ≥ 2. This is in fact similar to the erasure channel case [8] (see also [9, Appendix A] ), where the critical difference between m = 2 and m > 2 is that the key-reconciliation necessitated the use of ideas from Network Coding.
VI. GROUP SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER STATE-DEPENDENT GAUSSIAN BROADCAST CHANNELS
In this section, by using the results derived in the previous sections, we will study the secret key generation capacity among multiple terminals having access to a state-dependent Gaussian broadcast channel. We will derive upper and lower bounds for the secret key generation capacity. Although, the proposed bounds are not matched in general, we will show that they will match in the high-dynamic range, high-SNR regime in a degree of freedom sense.
A. Upper Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
In order to upper bound the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian broadcast channel, we cannot apply the result of Corollary 1 directly because this result has been derived under the assumption that the transmitted and received symbols are discreet. However, the work in [18] has extended the results of [14] 
Lemma 4: The key generation capacity of the Gaussian broadcast channel given in (4) using public discussions is upper bounded as follows
Proof: Using [18, Th. 3.2] and by proceeding similar steps to the proof of Corollary 1 (see [8] and [9] ), we can write
where (a) is true because of the symmetry. Hence, there exists an input distribution P X A such that E X A 2 ≤ L P max where the secrecy capacity is upper bounded as follows
where (a) is true since we have the Markov chain X B ↔ X A ↔ X E and (b) follows from the fact that the state variables are independent of X A and given X A and S B the only uncertainty left inX B is that of noise Z B . Now the above relation can be more simplified as follows
where (a) follows from the fact that for a fixed variance, Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy. The inequality (a) in (15) is achieved when (
has a Gaussian distribution. A sufficient condition for this to be satisfied is when X A , Z B , and Z E are Gaussian and independent, namely,
much easier as it is equivalent to the evaluation of h(
and Z E are Gaussian and independent as shown below,
Hence, the upper bound on the secrecy capacity reads as follows
where we are done.
B. Lower Bound for the Key Generation Capacity
Before stating our achievability scheme, let us first define a "nested message set, degraded channel" wiretap scenario. 
(16) Now suppose that a multi-receiver wiretap scenario as defined in Definition 3 consists of s + 1 independent Gaussian channels where the r th channel is defined as follows
where Z r [t] ∼ N(0, 1) and h r are some fixed constant representing the channel gains such that h 0 < · · · < h s . We also assume that the channel input is subject to an average power constraint P max , i.e.,
Then we can state the following result.
Lemma 5: Using a properly designed layered wiretap code similar to [7] and [10] , we can achieve the following set of rates for the "nested message set, degraded Gaussian wiretap channel,"
∀i ∈ [1 : s], where I i s j =i+1 P j . Proof: In the following, we will describe a code construction that achieves the rates stated in Lemma 5. Because it is very similar to [7] and also due to space limit, we only present a sketch of the proof for the theorem.
Assume that the code has s layers that correspond to each channel where they are indexed from 1 up to s (the channel Y 0 should decode nothing). To each layer a power constraint P i is assigned such that s i=1 P i ≤ P max . The transmitter uses superposition coding to encode each message W i that corresponds to layer i ; namely, it broadcasts
over the channel described by (17) . Then by receiving Y r , the r th receiver uses successive decoding, that starts from layer 1 to decode X 1 assuming the rest of the layers as noise and subtracting X 1 from the received vector after decoding. Then it continues this process to decode the rest of layers. 
At every layer i , each message is mapped into one bin, and one codeword in the bin is randomly chosen. So, layer i can transmits 2 L R i messages. Following a similar argument as stated in [7] and [10] , it can be shown that the above codebook satisfies the requirement of Definition 3.
Remark 5: Note that all of the above discussions are also valid for complex channels. The only difference is that there will be no 1 2 coefficient before rates given by (18) and other expressions should be updated accordingly. Now, as described in the proof of Lemma 5, by using a properly designed layered coding for the nested message set, degraded channel wiretap scenario, we can convert the Gaussian channel given in (4) to a set of s independent erasure channels where the erasure of the messages for each channel (layer) depends on the receiver channel state. In fact using the layered coding scheme for the wiretap channel, we mimic the orthogonality behaviour that we have for the deterministic channel as described by (6) and (12) .
To be more specific, we assume that Alice broadcasts an L-length vector
where she maps W i (the messages corresponding to the i th layer) to X A,i [t] according to the codebook described in the proof of Lemma 5. From the proof we know that the receiver r which observes the channel state S r = i can decode messages up to layer i and is ignorant about messages of layers above i . So, equivalently, we can say that the message W i experiences erasure probability θ i = i−1 j =0 δ j , when it passes through the channel (4). Now for each layer i , we run the interactive secret key sharing scheme introduced in [8] and [24] (also, see [9, Appendix A]) where Alice broadcasts an n-length sequence of random messages, i.e., W n i . Then, by discussing over the public channel, the trusted terminals reconcile their secret messages to build a common key. The key generation rate for each layer is i L R i , so for a fixed power allocation we achieve the following secrecy rate
where R i is defined in (18) 
The maximum secrecy rate is obtained by optimizing the above rate over the power allocations
. Thus we can write
Because R 1 is an increasing function of P 1 when other P i are kept fixed and R i does not also depend on P 1 for i > 1, we can write the power constraint inequality as an equality. We also apply a change of variables to Problem 19 from {P i } to {I k }. So we can rewrite (19) in the canonical form (see [25] ) as follows
where for convenience we define I 0 P max , I s 0, and we have also
In Section VII, we will focus on solving the optimization problem (20) .
C. Discussion About the Complexity of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we briefly discuss about the complexity of the proposed secret key sharing algorithm. In more detail, the algorithm consists of two main parts. First, as discussed in Section VI-B, by applying a multi-layer wiretap code [7] , [10] , a Gaussian broadcast channel is converted to a number of different message-level erasure broadcast channels. Then in the second part, for each layer, assuming a messagelevel broadcast erasure channel, legitimate terminals create a shared secret key among themselves where this scheme presented in [8] , [9] , [22] , and [24] . Hence, we can break up the complexity analysis of the proposed scheme into two parts.
For the complexity analysis of the second part, referring to [8] , [9] , [22] , and [24] , we can easily observe that each of the legitimate nodes needs to perform O(n 2 L) operations where n is the number of packets and L is the packet length. Additionally, the total communication complexity, i.e., number of transmitted bits, of this algorithm is O(n(n + L)) bits. For the first part of the algorithm one needs to consider a practical implementation of wiretap codes. For example we can use the result of [26] where constructs such a wiretap code. The encoding and decoding complexity of the proposed wiretap code is linear in the packet length (i.e., L in our setup) since it is an LDPC code. So, this part of the scheme can at most add O(nL) operations to the complexity of each node. Hence, to summarize, the total computation complexity of all nodes remain the same as each of them needs O(n 2 L) operations. Moreover, the total communication complexity of the algorithm is O(n(n + L) ) bits.
VII. SOLVING THE NON-CONVEX POWER ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Here, we present how the optimization problem (20) can be solved. Our final result is not in closed form but instead we propose a recursive algorithm (i.e., a dynamic program) that finds all the possible solutions of KKT 5 conditions (which provide necessary conditions for an optimal solution to the optimization problem (20) ) and find an optimum solution by searching among them. By using the proposed algorithm, we reduce the search space of the optimization problem (20) from a multi-dimensional continuous space to a finite elements set; i.e., the set of solutions to the KKT conditions. In this sense, the final result is exact (the proposed algorithm is not a numerical approximation), but it is hard to describe the solution in a single closed form equation for all possible parameters involved in the secrecy problem (e.g., channel gains, probability distribution over states, etc.). However, note that for each set of given problem parameters, it is possible to state the final solution in terms of these given parameters (but here we only focus on deriving the final "value" of the solution, not its "expression"). To find the optimal solutions of the abovementioned optimization problem, we proceed as follows.
Because the constraints of optimization problem (20) are affine, we can use the KKT conditions to derive a set of necessary conditions for the optimum power allocation (e.g., see [27, Ch. 5] ). By defining the Lagrangian L as
and applying the KKT theorem (e.g., see [25, Ch. 5]), we write a set of necessary conditions for the optimal solution of (20) as follows
By taking the derivative of L with respect to I k , ∀k ∈ [1 : s − 1], and doing some algebra we get
k (I k ) is defined accordingly. Notice that because I k 's are positive variables the denominator of F (1) k (I k ) is strictly positive. For the ease of reference, some of the important variables of our problem are gathered in Table I .
The main idea of our proof is to propose a recursive algorithm that first finds all the solutions of the KKT equations (21), (with an abuse of notation) each is denoted by {I * k } s k=0 . Then among these solutions finds the one that maximizes the secrecy rate given by (20) , which is denoted by {I * * k } s k=0 . 5 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (e.g., see [25] ). To this end, in every iteration, the proposed algorithm picks some k (for that I * k is not determined yet) and then determine the sign of F (1) k (x) (or as will be discussed later, for some cases determine the sign of F (2) k (x) which will be defined in (24) ). Then using (22) (or in some cases using (24) ) in addition to the complementary slackness condition, it determines whether we have to examine the following three cases:
, or (iii) the value of I * k is determined in this iteration. Hence, at the end of each iteration the size of the optimization problem is reduced by one (either I * k is determined in this iteration or is equal to the I * k−1 or I * k+1 ). Ignoring the details for a moment, we can repeat the above procedure until all values of I * k are determined. These sets of I * k 's are the solutions to the KKT conditions (21) . Considering more details, we can proceed as follows. First, let r (1) k to be the root of the numerator of F (1) 
and by convention set r 6 Here by the linear case, we mean that the numerator of F
(1) (22) is a linear function of I k . (1) k < 0 and F (1) k (x) < 0 for x ≥ 0. Because of (22) (1) k (x) > 0 for x > r (1) k and F (1) k (x) < 0 for x < r (1) k . Now, there exists the following different cases: (20), if we have I * k = I * k+l then we should also have I * k = I * k+1 = · · · = I * k+l . Now suppose that, by some mean (e.g., from the previous iterations of our proposed algorithm for finding the solutions of KKT equations (21)), we know that I * k = I * k+l . This knowledge enables us to reduce the size of the optimization problem (20) . Notice that after having this information, the derivative of the Lagrangian L with respect to I k is not given by (22) anymore. More precisely, let us assume that I * k = I * k+l . Then, taking the derivative of L with respect to I k and by doing some algebra, we can write
complementary slackness condition leads to I
Notice that for all values of l ∈ [1 : s − k], the numerator of F (2) k (I k ) is a quadratic function in I k and the denominator is strictly positive for I k ≥ 0 because h k 's are positive real quantities.
Similar to the Case 1, here in this case, we can also find the real roots r (2) k,1 and r (2) k,2 of the numerator of F (2) k (x) and find the sign of the function F (2) k (x) for different values of x ∈ [0, P max ] based on the place of these roots. Hence, based on the real roots of the numerator of F (2) k (x), we can write a set of different conditions similar to Case 1, as stated in Case 2. (2) k (x) has two distinct real roots r (2) k,1 < r (2) k,2 where r
Then we have to consider the following five different cases for the solution I * k : (1) 
k,2 , and (5) I * k ∈ r (2) k,2 , P max . In the items (1) , (3) , and (5) one can find the sign of F (2) k (x) in the corresponding interval and based on that determine whether we should have
Remark 6: It is worth to emphasize that the structure of the optimization problem (20) is such that the denominator of F (1) k (x) and F (2) k (x) are always strictly positive for x ≥ 0. Moreover, the numerator of F (1) k (x) is always at most a linear function of x and that of F (2) k (x) is always at most a quadratic function in x. This fact significantly simplifies finding the solutions of KKT equations (21) and hence solving the optimization problem (20) .
The above discussion for different possible cases based on the numerator roots of F can be applied to any specific instance of the optimization problem (20) . As briefly explained before, the main idea is to apply a recursive algorithm that finds the set of solutions of (21) iteratively by determining variables I k 's one by one. This procedure can also be considered as reducing the size of the optimization problem (20) (i.e., number of states) by one in every iteration.
To better explain our proposed method, we present the pseudo code of our algorithm in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. 7 Here by the quadratic case, we mean that the numerator of F (2) 
For more clarification, in addition to the comments inside the pseudo code, the important variables of the pseudo code are explained separately in Table II .
Putting it together, we can describe our algorithm as follows (see also Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2). First, Algorithm 1 initializes a data structure d(i ) for each i ∈ [0 : s] which contains the required information about I * i (see Lines 1 to 8 of Algorithm 1). Then it calls Algorithm 2 that is a recursive function.
Starting from the original KKT conditions, at every iteration, Algorithm 2 picks a number k (such that I k is not determined yet) and apply Case 1 or Case 2 (depending if it is linear or quadratic case) to that particular I k (see Lines 3, 6 and 16 of Algorithm 2). By doing so, the size of the original KKT conditions (i.e., number of undetermined variables I k ) is reduced by one and we may have up to five (in fact up to three if Case 1 holds and up to five if Case 2 holds) new set of KKT conditions to be solved. Now, we can repeat the above process on each of these new set of conditions and go forward iteratively (see Lines 13 and 23 of Algorithm 2). This procedure is like discovering a tree starting from some point as root (the root is determined by the first k ∈ [1 : s − 1] picked up by the algorithm). Note that many of these new set of conditions do not lead to valid solutions that satisfy the original KKT conditions (21) . This will be determined later as the algorithm proceeds by observing some contradictions on the intervals of I k 's. This process continues until we obtain problems of zero size (that have all variable I k 's determined and satisfy the original KKT conditions (21); Line 29 of Algorithm 2) or at some point in the middle of the algorithm the determined I k 's up to that point violate the KKT conditions (so this particular branch will be discarded; Lines 12 and 22 of Algorithm 2).
The above-mentioned algorithm enables us to find all of the solutions to KKT conditions (21) . Then because the KKT equations provide a necessary condition on the optimal solution, it is sufficient to check among all of the solutions of KKT equations to find the optimal power allocation for the optimization problem (20) (Line 10 of Algorithm 1). Consequently, the search space of the original optimization problem is reduced from the continuous space R s−1 to a set of size at most 5 s−1 elements. Note that this is the worst case analysis and in practice the size of the set can be much smaller than this number. 8 In the following, in Lemma 6 and in Section VII-A, we present two special cases for the optimization problem (20) that is insightful.
Lemma 6: Consider the set of {r 
Proof:
For the proof of this lemma refer to [9, Appendix B] .
A. High-Dynamic Range, High-SNR Regime
In this section, we show that our proposed achievability scheme, stated in Section VI-B, is optimal for the "high-dynamic range, high-SNR regime" in a degrees of freedom sense. We first give a formal definition of degrees of freedom in our setup as follows. The degrees of freedom for secret key sharing over a state dependent Gaussian broadcast channel is defined as
Clearly, as Q → ∞, h i h i−1 (high-dynamic range) and h i 1 (high-SNR). The following theorem completely characterizes DoF s , and hence proves the optimality of our proposed achievability scheme in the high-dynamic range and high-SNR regime. 
where (a) follows from h i h i−1 and Lemma 6. Upper bound on DoF s : An upper bound on DoF s can be derived as shown below, where (a) follows from Lemma 4 and (b) follows by exchanging the order of the summations. The above upper bound on DoF s matches the lower bound in (25) and this completes the proof of the theorem.
B. Numerical Evaluations
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of the secret key sharing scheme proposed in Section VII for a few examples and compare it with the upper bound stated in Lemma 4.
Example 1: Consider a setup with 3 states (s = 2) where h 0 = −5dB, −5dB < h 1 < 30dB and h 2 = 30dB. The probability distribution across the states is assumed to be uniform. Figure 3 shows the achievable rate and the upper bound as a function of h 1 with the following choices of P max : (a) P max = 0.01 and (b) P max = 10. Clearly, there is a gap between the upper bound and the achievable rate. As it is mentioned before, the proposed scheme is not optimal in an absolute sense, but only in a degrees of freedom sense as proved in Section VII-A.
Example 2: Consider a setup with 4 states where h 0 = −5dB, h 3 = 30dB, h 1 = min[g 1 , g 2 ] dB and h 2 = max[g 1 , g 2 ] dB where −5dB < g 1 , g 2 < 30dB. The probability distribution across the states is assumed to be uniform. Figure 4 shows the achievable rate and the upper bound as a function of g 1 and g 2 with P max = 10. Similar to Figure 5 shows the fraction of P max allocated to each state by the proposed scheme for P max ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100}.
The above examples illustrate different aspects of the proposed scheme: the gap with respect to the upper bound and the distribution of power across the states. In general, these aspects depend on the setup parameters. For a given setup, the numerical implementation of our proposed scheme can be used for efficient evaluations, even with a large number of states (e.g., 36 states in Example 3).
VIII. DISCUSSION, OPEN QUESTIONS
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS Here, in this section we bring forward discussion about multi-party secret key sharing problem, open questions and possible future directions.
First, the SKG capacity problem among multiple terminals over a state-dependent Gaussian channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper is still unsolved. But, the optimality of the proposed multi-party secret key sharing scheme has been shown for deterministic channels (that includes the erasure channels as a special case). By having intuition from this result, the achievability scheme for the Gaussian statedependent channel is based on the message level erasure, simulated by using the wiretap code. However, in our outer bound on the SKG capacity, we do not have such an assumption and this can be a reason that explains the gap between our achievability scheme and outer bound.
Similar ideas used in this work for the secret key sharing problem over erasure channels can also be applied for the secret communication over these channels, e.g., see [28] . However, in our work, we go beyond and used these ideas to propose a coding scheme for multi-terminal secret key sharing over the Gaussian state-dependent broadcast channel (in the presence of public discussion). On the other hand, this is still open whether the same connection can be obtained between secret communication over erasure and statedependent Gaussian channels or not.
In our achievability scheme, we use public channel to send feedback from all the receivers to Alice. However, it is worth mentioning that although the public channel is available and without cost, we use it to communicate only the channel state which is a limited feedback; but not to transmit all the output feedback. Hence, it is possible to adopt our protocol to use ACK/NAK (e.g., similar to [24] ) instead of public channel. However, the resulting protocol maybe not optimal even for the deterministic channels.
We would like to emphasize that this thread of work is not pure theoretical and there have been some attempts to implement these ideas (e.g., see [21] [22] [23] [24] ). As an example, [24] reports to create shared secret key in a test-bed containing 5 nodes at rate 10 kbit/sec, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.
Finally, in this work we do not claim that our proposed scheme is a complete replacement of existing cryptosystems that rely on the adversarys computational limitations. However, if it is used in collaboration with such systems it can add an extra layer of security to the system in the physical layer.
